Psychological Perspectives
In addition to the abovementioned paradigms, psychologists studying political decision-making have provided a different line of criticisms of the rationalchoice perspective, and have started to formulate yet different analytical models. Psychological research on political decision-making builds upon the work of pioneers as Lasswell, Leites, George, Simon, and March. It stresses the importance that individual capabilities and personal characteristics and propensities of individual actors can have on the course and outcomes of political decisionmaking processes. Psychological studies brought "man back in": In contrast to organizational and political paradigms that emphasize meso-and macrolevel processes, psychological studies focus on the micro-level (individual decisionmakers alone and in interaction). Janis's work, not only on groupthink but also in his well-known study with Mann (1977), is part of this emerging psychological contribution to the field of political decision-making [see Holsti (1977) , M. Hermann (1978) , Kinder and Weiss (1978) , Falkowski (1979) Emotions and motivations consciously and unconsciously affecting the attitudes and behavioral predispositions of decision-makers, including many works on the effects of psychological stress and individual coping strategies (for example, Cottam, 1977; Etheredge, 1985 ; see also Janis and Mann, 1977) , as well psychobiographical accounts of socialization and development of the person-alities of key politicians and bureaucrats (for example, the classic George and George, 1956);
Leadership and interpersonal style of prominent political leaders and bureaucratic entrepreneurs, specifying how key actors interact with others in their social and professional environments [for example: Lewis (1980) , Doig and Hargrove (1987) ; elements of this approach can be found in Janis (1989) ]; Group processes, focusing on the formation and dynamics of small groups as muchneglected fora of political and bureaucratic decision-making (Golembiewski, 1978 ).
Janis's work on groupthink fits into the latter category. In fact, it has been one of the pioneering studies in this area. At the time of its publication, it was rare in its broad interdisciplinary (social psychology, political science, history) approach and its extensive use of comparable case studies outlining the argument and developing and illustrating the theory. This methodology, as well as Janis's lucid style, made it appeal to an unusually broad audience, including many political scientists and international-relations analysis who were otherwise not inclined to consult psychological studies employing strictly experimental methods. Later on, the book was also adopted by students of organizational behavior and managerial decision-making (for example: DuBrin, 1984; Swap, 1984; Leavitt and Bahrami, 1985; Pennings et al., 1985) .
In this sense, Janis's study on groupthink has stimulated interdisciplinary efforts. At the same time, these very qualities have made this work vulnerable to various discipline-bound criticisms. Historians are bound to criticize the focused and potentially superficial case accounts and interpretations (Welch, 1989) , and experimentally inclined psychologists will point to empirical ambiguities and difficulties in pinpointing causality due to the post hoc nature of case study research (Longley and Pruitt, 1980 ).
Research Tradition: Cohesiveness and Group Performance
Having placed groupthink within its broader interdisciplinary context, it is time to zoom in and present in greater detail the theoretical and empirical roots of groupthink analysis. These are to be found in social psychology. Groupthink can be considered an anomalous branch on the broad tree of research on group cohesiveness and group performance that constitutes a substantive body of knowledge within group dynamics. The cohesiveness of decision-making groups is the crucial linchpin in Janis's own depiction of the dynamics of groupthink. In fact, it is the sole group-level factor that he singles out as a substantive, independent cause of groupthink.
Cohesiveness, viewed by Janis and most other small-group theorists as the extent of "sticking togetherness" of members of a group, is one of the crucial 't Hart factors in group functioning. It is also one of the most intensely researched variables in the social psychology of small groups. Perhaps partly because of its very pervasiveness, it is also one of the most elusive and multifaceted aspects of (decision) groups: there are several competing notions of cohesiveness; there are different techniques of measuring cohesiveness which do not always yield consistent results; Cohesiveness affects group behavior in numerous ways. It pervades both group structure and process, and cohesiveness factors may act as either independent, intermediate, or dependent variable. Essentially, many of the unresolved problems in the analysis of group cohesiveness reported twenty years ago by Cartwright, still exist today: How do various sources of attraction combine in a composite measure of cohesiveness, what is the importance of different sources of attraction on group cohesiveness and its subsequent effects upon group behavior, and what is the nature of causal linkages involving group cohesiveness and other aspects of group structure and process (Cartwright, 1968 ; see also Golembiewski, 1962; Verba; 1962; Golembiewski et al., 1968; Hare, 1976 )?
Cohesiveness and Group Members
Just after World War II, cohesiveness research moved swiftly through the systemic efforts of Festinger, Schachter, Back, and their associates. Much of the research program on informal social communication by Festinger and his colleagues was devoted to studying group effects on individual members. The investigators, soon to be followed by a vast number of others, found that cohesive groups exert certain pressures toward uniformity upon their members. More generally, as Shaw observed, "[Groups] characterized by friendliness, cooperation, interpersonal attraction, and similar indications of group cohesiveness exert strong influence upon members to behave in accordance with group expectations. Members of cohesive groups are motivated to respond positively to others in the group, and their behavior should reflect this motivation" (Shaw, 1981, p.218) . In cohesive groups, the explicit or implicit norms and standards that underlie the functioning of any collectivity, gain importance. It is held that the more cohesive the group, the more its members tend to abide by its norms of conduct.
There appears to be a compelling logic in this proposition: The more cohesive the group, the greater the members' satisfaction with it and the greater their willingness to remain part of it, hence the greater their incentives to think and act as the group does. Yet, this final step is taken too hastily. Whether a group member feels compelled to go along with the group, depends entirely upon the content of the group's norms. Group norms may very well encourage critical discussion and dissent by minorities or individual members. It should be added that this is not very often the case. Usually group norms tend to stress the importance of consensus and joint action, hence the tendency toward uniformity. The key point to remember, however, is that cohesiveness increases the power of group norms, and these may or may not favor uniformity.
In practice, the tendency for conformity in cohesive groups is widespread. Research by Festinger et al. and many of their students has illustrated this in both laboratory and field settings (Asch, 1952; Hare, 1976; McGrath, 1984) . The very cohesiveness of the group promotes this: Because group members emphatically want to remain in the group as respected participants, the group enjoys considerable sanctioning power. It has at its disposal a wide range of techniques for changing the opinions and behaviors of a deviant member: from occasional remarks or jokes that alert the deviant to the group norm, to (threats of) rejection and expulsion. The group member who is able to withstand such pressure has to be a formidable individual. Yet, as the literature on deviance and psychological reactance has shown, under certain conditions, deviants may persist and serve as catalysts for group changes (Schachter, 1951 ; see overviews in Diener, 1980 and Dickenberger and Gniech, 1982) .
Cohesiveness and Group Problem Solving
At a very general level, field studies have shown that cohesive groups are more effective in accomplishing group goals than non-cohesive groups. Similarly, studies of group problem-solving show that cohesive groups perform well (Shaw and Shaw, 1962; Maier, 1970) . In the literature contrasting individual and group performance, the benefits of group cohesion have been stressed again and again. The advantages of groups are said to lie mainly in the sphere of the quantity and quality of information storage and retrieval. Also, groups are more successful than individuals in generating a wide range of alternatives. At the same time, group decision-making has some costs: It takes more time and it requires a sometimes difficult give-and-take between group members. In this context, the value of cohesiveness is stressed as promoting a congenial and taskoriented atmosphere, which allegedly facilitates group discussion (see, for instance, Miesing and Preble, 1985) .
These are all familiar arguments. And it was precisely this line of thinking that Janis was contending with. He surmised that, at a certain point, high cohesion becomes detrimental to the quality of decision-making. This idea was most impressive in its counterintuitive power: the realization that, depending upon the content of group norms, harmonious, cooperative, teamlike entities may be a liability rather than an asset in producing high-quality decisions.
This is not what one would expect. At face value, it seems perfectly sensible that a tightly knit group, where members like each other and cooperate smoothly, is likely to produce better decisions at lower costs than groups where members cooperate less, groups where there is little common ground between members, and groups characterized by internal conflicts. The basic thesis of groupthink is, of course, exactly the reverse: The very cohesiveness of the group may become a value in itself for each of the members, and to such an extent that they may be reluctant to say or do anything that might disturb it, such as voicing criticisms against the ideas and opinions of other members or the group's majority. Furthermore, it may even affect (delimit) their capacity to think critically.
This lack of frankness is detrimental to the making of consequential decisions, where discussion and a certain amount of dissent are indispensible in arriving at well-grounded choices.
The characteristics of groupthink are, in fact, geared to the preservation of group cohesion and high spirits through the quick attainment and preservation of consensus on the issue the group confronts. Ultimately, this can produce unsound decisions leading to the kind of policy fiascoes analyzed by Janis.
However, in the experimental literature on group decision-making and task performance, little support for this contention could be found, Janis's case rested more on the above-discussed findings on pressures toward uniformity and on his studies of combat units (to be described below). At the same time, studies of U.S. foreign policy decision-making provide mostly anecdotal support for Janis ' Janis, 1989) . Focusing on small-group performance under stress, Janis was heavily influenced by psychodynamic theory, stressing the role of individual and collective defense mechanisms in coping with anxiety. Among these was the illusion of invulnerability:
A variety of less overt personal defenses against anxiety is likely to develop. Complete denial of the impending danger, implicit trust in the protectiveness of the authorities, reversion to an infantile belief in personal omnipotence-these and other unconscious or partially conscious defense mechanisms have been described as typical modes of adjustment during a period of impending air attack. Irrespective of the particular modes of defense a person employs, however, the net effect may be an illusion of personal invulnerability. (Janis, 1971) In his early work on coping with stress, the roots of Janis's counterconventional view of the effects of high cohesion on group performance can be found. This basically psychoanalitic view suggests that, even if a group fails to achieve its formal goals or stated official objectives, its cohesiveness may remain unchecked. It may, indeed, even grow, as the members view one another and the group as a whole as a source of emotional consolation, quite independently from task-and goal-related considerations. Lott and Lott have signalled that when failures are perceived by the group members to be arbitrarily "imposed" by sources outside the group's control, there is a good chance that attraction to the group increases (Lott and Lott, 1965 ; see also Mulder and Stemerding, 1965; Rabbie and Wilkens, 1971 ). This is even more so when group members lack an exit option: They cannot dissociate themselves, so they decide to make the most of it ('t Hart, 1990).
However, laboratory research has made it clear that there is no simple and clear-cut linkage between external stress and increased group cohesiveness.
Hamblin hypothesized that group integration actually decreases when members either feel that they can do better by a timely retreat from the group, or perceive that there is no solution to the crisis available at all. In these situations, group members may display more self-oriented behavior and indulge in imposing negative sanctions upon their colleagues (Hamblin, 1958 (Hamblin, , 1960 . In his research on stress in task groups, Payne emphasized that for groups under stress to become more integrated, it is necessary that the members have interpersonal skills (Payne, 1981) .
In conclusion, one could argue that although qualifications are needed, the groupthink concept effectively turns around some of the traditional ideas about the effects of "cohesiveness" on group performance. To a great extent, Janis's contribution lies in developing and pursuing a counterintuitive line of thinking. Moreover, he has applied it to historic cases of political decision-making. Let us now turn to the main thrust of his analysis.
JANIS ON GROUPTHINK

What is groupthink? How does it come about? What are its specific antecedents and effects?
The most systematic treatment of these issues can be found in the second edition of Janis's book, which extends and above all systematizes the earlier formulation [Janis, (1982a) ; see also the early re-working in Janis and Mann (1977) , and the more applied interpretations in Janis (1982b Janis ( , 1986 ]. In his recent study Crucial Decisions, he has presented the groupthink phenomenon within a broader context of decision heuristics and shortcuts to rationality, while at the same time responding to some of the critical comments raised in response to the two editions of the groupthink study, however, without changing the theory as such (Janis, 1989 ).
Definition
Originally, Janis defined groupthink as follows: "A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action" (1982a, p.9). As Longley and Pruitt have pointed out, this definition is confusing as it incorporates not only the process itself (a certain mode of collective thinking), but also some of its antecedents (a cohesive in-group, personal involvement in it by individual members), as well as some of its effects (a reduced capacity to realistically appraise alternative courses of action). In his later formulations, Janis has not, as Longley and Pruitt imply, changed his definition (Longley and Pruitt, 1980) . Rather he has provided an operational formulation of it; the causal connections between antecedents, indicators and effects are made explicit in a flow chart (see Fig. 1 ).
Thus, it turns out that groupthink stands for concurrence-seeking, that is, the tendency for group members toward converging opinions about the adoption of a certain course of action in a given decision situation. 2. Those producing closed-mindedness (collective rationalizations; stereotyped images of out-groups).
3. Those producing pressures toward uniformity (self-censorship; illusion of unanimity; direct pressures on dissenters; self-appointed mindguards).
From these characteristics, one cannot doubt the negative evaluation of groupthink that pervades Janis's writings on the subject. All characteristics seem malicious: while the pressures toward uniformity can be viewed as indicator of excessive concurrence-seeking as such, the other two types of characteristics (overestimation, closed-mindedness) assure that this concurrence-seeking takes place in the context of "bad" policies.
According to Janis, concurrence-seeking as such is a necessary element within each collective decision process (especially when unanimity is called for). At a certain point in the deliberative process, discussions need to be concluded and actions taken. In this respect, there is not so much difference from processes of individual decision-making, where decision-makers start "bolstering" their preferred alternatives (Soelberg, 1967; Janis and Mann, 1977). However, concurrence-seeking becomes excessive when it takes place too early and in too restrictive a way. This need still not be fatal, if the group is embarking on, more or less accidentally, a sound alternative. It is the other set of characteristics of groupthink that are likely to prevent this from happening: Closed-minded, stereotyped, overconfident and morally exempt decision-makers are highly unlikely to strike the right, or at least a satisfactory, key. Tetlock has made content analyses of speeches by decision-makers associated with groupthink and non-groupthink decisions, as they were outlined in Janis's book. Using a technique called integrative complexity coding, he found that relative to nongroupthink, decision makers were more simplistic in their perceptions of policy issues and made more positive references to the United States and its allies (own group). Inconsistent with Janis' theory, groupthink decision makers did not make significant more negative references to Communist States and their allies (opponents). (Tetlock, 1979 , p.1314; see also Suedfield and Tetlock, 1977) In assessing the contributions of this specific technique, Tetlock stretches its heuristic value: detecting probable cases for groupthink analysis. His method has not since been pursued in groupthink analysis.
GROUFI'HINK AS
Gero used a questionnaire to examine further the effects of a consensus style of group decision-making on expectations of intra-group conflict among group members. She found that there may be a strong inclination toward amiability and agreement in consensus climates. The potentially adverse effects on decision quality are discussed (Gero, 1985) .
Finally, attempts have been made to add more cases to the groupthink catalogue. Following a magazine article by Janis, Smith has attempted to document the suggestion that groupthink dominated the Carter decision-making process with respect to the hostage rescue mission to Iran. Heller, in an article in the Guardian, linked groupthink to the conduct of the Falkland Islands war by the Thatcher cabinet (Janis, 1980; Smith, 1984; and Gabriel, 1985; Heller, 1983) . These latter examples cannot always be considered succesful. They are all very casual and lacking in psychological proficiency to make them serious contributions. On the contrary, such quick-and-easy characterizations may create an illusion that groupthink is an all-purpose, little-effort label explaining just about any case of policy failure. This is deplorable, and Janis has gone to great lengths in calling for caution in linking groupthink to policy outcomes, as well as in providing a sound framework of all relevant factors to be actually used in groupthink analysis.
A more substantive effort was undertaken by Rosenthal. In a comprehensive analysis of several cases of crisis decision-making in the Netherlands (disasters, riots, terrorism), he systematically checked the evidence of groupthink. In some cases, positive indications were found, in others not (Rosenthal, 1984) 
Using Cases to Adapt the Theory
McCauley used the original case studies by Janis to substantiate his theoretical claim that groupthink comes about not only through "amiabilityinduced" internalization of group norms and opinions, but also through mere compliance (public agreement on the part of individual group members not accompanied by private acceptance of the prevailing perspective). McCauley's analysis rightly calls attention to the status and power dimensions of group decision-making (McCauley, 1990).
In my dissertation, I have further elaborated on this line of thinking, arguing that, on the basis of findings on changing patterns of hierarchy and leadership in small groups under stress, "anticipatory compliance" of group members to senior members or leader figures constitutes an alternative path towards groupthink (e.g., excessive concurrence-seeking). In other words, strong affective ties between group members are not a necessary variable in producing groupthink. Given a basic amount of group cohesion seen as interdependence between members, groupthink may also arise because low-status members anticipate thoughts, wishes or commands from leader figures, and adapt their own thinking and action accordingly ('t Hart, 1990).
Similarly, Whyte has made an attempt at comparing the groupthink construct with related approaches of high-risk group decision-making based on framing and prospect theory, and examines the relative merits of these alternative approaches in explaining empirical cases of decisional fiascoes, mentioning the Challenger disaster and the Iran-Contra scandal as potential cases (Whyte, 1989 ).
Additional Case Work
The Challenger case was subject to a more quantitatively oriented test of 
Laboratory Replications
In addition to the case approach, interesting attempts have been made to investigate whether groupthink (unconventional to many experimental psychologists because of its real-world empirical basis), can also be observed in decision groups working under laboratory conditions.
Flowers conducted an experiment with problem-solving groups in which he systematically varied leadership style (closed; open) and group cohesiveness (high; low). He hypothesized that decision processes of the high cohesiveness/closed leadership variant would most likely be characterized by groupthink. Using a somewhat debatable research design, his findings stress the importance of the leadership variable, while no evidence could be obtained with respect to cohesiveness, implicitly supporting the view that there is an alternative pathway to groupthink independent from group cohesiveness, stressing the role of compliance instead (Flowers, 1977) .
A more sophisticated design was presented by Courtright. He also focused upon group cohesiveness and (non-)directive leadership, but he devised much more credible experimental procedures to attain them. Also, he put forward a convincing measure of the dependent variable, that is, the quality of decisionmaking. His major findings suggest (a) the feasibility of the groupthink phenomenon as such (in particular types of decision groups); (b) that the absence of disagreement in directive leader/high cohesiveness groups is one of the major factors contributing to the-alleged-low quality of decision-making in these groups. As such, Courtright seems to have come across a plausible operational measure of concurrence-seeking [Courtright (1976), a comparable design and similar results were later reported by Callaway et al., (1985) ].
Further, Fodor and Smith also studied the leadership and cohesiveness variables in an experimental group problem-solving design. They, however, did not manipulate the style of leadership by instructions. Rather, they sought out group leaders high and respectively low in n-Power, that is, in power motive action. Strikingly, the low n-Power leaders presided over the groups that produced better decisions that those headed by high n-Power leaders. Like Flowers, Fodor and Smith could also not find significant effects of group cohesiveness. Again, as in 't Hart the Flowers study, this lack of results may be due to the rather simplistic experimental manipulation of the cohesiveness variable, yet it may also point toward the abovementioned multipath explanation of groupthink [Fodor and Smith (1985) ; similar results were reported by Leana (1985) ].
Moorhead has developed a clear model of what would be needed to adequately test for groupthink in decision-making groups (Moorhead, 1982) . His attempts to use the model in an empirical analysis of teams of management students engaged in a 3-month intergroup competition provided material for additional doubts concerning the overarching (negative) impact of high group cohesiveness (Moorhead and Montaneri, 1986).
t have developed a decision-simulation design testing the effects of different modes of accountability for decisions among group members upon the quality of decision-making. The decisional context was designed to incorporate many of the theoretical antecedents to groupthink. It was found that decision-making groups that do not have to account for their judgments and choices displayed more tendencies toward groupthink-like patterns of group decision-making than groups whose members, either collectively or individually, did have to render account.
Groupthink and Choice Shift
As Whyte (1989) has rightly noted, Janis does not elaborately discuss a long-standing research tradition within group dynamics, namely research on group polarization and choice shifts. Although Janis hypothesizes that the group process induces group members to adopt courses of action that seem to involve high risks of failure, he has not developed his argument with sufficient reference to the results of experimental and field studies and criticisms of the "risky shift" (i.e., group interaction favors more risky solutions than individual members would have adopted without group discussion), the cautious shift (the reverse phenomenon) and other work on group polarization (Moscovici, 1976; Lamm and Meyers, 1978; Meertens, 1980) . This gap has partially been filled by followup research.
Minix has used groupthink to explain choice shifts in the context of crisis decision-making (Minix, 1982) . The key question was whether decision groups, confronted with various feasible scenarios of international crisis events, would reach different (more or less risky decisions) than individuals. To enhance external relevance, Minix's subjects included military officers, the closest he could come to running the experiment with officials who actually make these decisions in real-life situations (other groups were cadets and university students). In his theoretical discussion, Minix discussed at length the crisis literature in order to illustrate the validity of a small-group approach to the analysis of crisis decision-making. He stressed that maintaining decision quality under stress was a vital problem in crisis decision-making. Further, he elaborated upon groupthink as a syndrome that was not only likely to appear in crisis decision-making by small groups, but also detrimental to the quality of decision making. In this respect, excessive risk-taking was regarded as a pivotal factor.
In the analysis of his results-which showed a rather differentiated pattern of risk propensities in his three populations-Minix hinted at elements from the antecedents and symptoms of groupthink being operative in the dynamics of choice shifts. These included, first and foremost, the operation and differentiated content of group norms and standards among the three populations, but also phenomena such as collective psychological rigidity, defective information processing (for instance, uncritical reliance upon historical analogies), and the steering role of group leaders. The selection of subjects-college students, naval cadets, and navy officers-reflects Minix's emphasis on the importance of normative orientations as an explanatory factor. Minix's work indicates that there may be connections between groupthink and risk-taking in crisis situations. In that respect, his work can be viewed as lending support to earlier assertions by De Rivera, who examined the risk-taking process in the Korean decision-an episode which Janis later explained as a groupthink decision (De Rivera, 1968) .
Why, then, do groupthink groups tend to play down uncertainties and neglect the risk dimension of their preferred policies? The fact that they do so should be quite clear from some of the symptoms of groupthink. The overestimation of the group through the illusion of invulnerability and the belief in the inherent morality of the group sets the stage for overoptimism. It is reinforced by closed-mindedness (rationalizations and stereotypes), while cautionary forces within the group are prevented from gaining leverage by the the operation of uniformity pressures. Whyte (1989) has argued that excessive risk-taking in the group decisions leading to policy fiascoes is due to group polarization effects occurring when group members perceive the choice situation as being one of choosing between a sure loss and an alternative which entails the possibility of a greater loss. These perceptions may be the result of biased decision "frames" adopted by the members of the group. The effect of group interaction will be to amplify the dominant individual preference for risk that characterizes individual group members confronted with these perceived "no-win" situations. This thesis remains to be explored by systematic empirical research.
On the basis of a more elaborate review of the polarization literature, I have argued for another interpretation ('t Hart, 1990 ). In my view, there exists a paradoxical relationship between groupthink and risk-taking: It is precisely because the risk dimension of their actions becomes less relevant to members of decision groups caught up in the groupthink syndrome, that they will not refrain from supporting alternatives that are highly risky. In reconsidering the psycho-logical processes underlying groupthink, there are some remarkable resemblances with other group research. For instance, the characteristics and consequences of deindividuation contain forces which provoke a negligence of risks. For deindividuated groups, the future as such loses relevance. They become less concerned about the longer-term consequences of their actions; they are insensitive to the thought that they are taking any "risks" at all.
While this may seem an extreme form of risk negligence, there are striking correspondences between this psychological syndrome and the complacent groups of Admiral Kimmel and President Nixon examined by Janis. In both the Pearl Harbor and Watergate cases, there were marked instances where the groups failed to take into consideration future consequences and risks of what they were advocating. Likewise, groups acting under great stress such as Truman's Korean group and, at times, Johnson's Vietnam Tuesday Luncheon group seemed to suffer from a collapsed time-perspective, a cognitive pattern that is frequently found as a (defensive) response to overload and stress (Holsti, 1979; Holsti and George, 1975 
Additional Research Required
In reviewing the various findings of replication studies, it should be remarked that their number is modest, their quality mixed and their findings only partially conclusive (see, however, Janis, 1989). Real-world replications often lack in analytical rigor, while laboratory replications are plagued by the seeming impossibility of incorporating more than only a very limited number of variables in their designs. In particular, experimental studies of groupthink have rarely succeeded in creating the kind of decisional stress that is a crucial element of the preconditions for groupthink outlined in the Janis model. All in all, this examination of empirical replications leads one to sympathize with Rosenthal's assessment that "[it] has proved to be extremely difficult to produce indisputable information about groupthink" [Rosenthal (1986, 
THE GREAT DEBATE: GROUTI'HINK AND DECISION QUALITY
As can be observed from the presentation of follow-up studies, the empirical validity of groupthink is a matter to be settled by further research using a variety of methods, ultimately producing a more specified, contingent perspective on the occurrence of groupthink, i.e., a better demarcation of the contextual factors conducive to groupthink.
Much more difficult to resolve are issues concerning the effects of groupthink on decision outputs, and hence the evaluation of groupthink as a mode of policy-making. Does groupthink indeed produce bad decisions all of the time? Why should this be the case? And to what extent can the decisional outputs of groupthink be characterized in more theoretical terms?
Theoretical Considerations The quality of high-level policy-making is a key issue not only with regard to government action but also in major corporations, whose decisions equally affect large segments of society. Decision-makers need to anticipate and circumvent the complexities of decision-making in the multi-actor, multi-interest environment that characterizes most issues that require top-level consideration. Government authorities need to deal with cognitive and value complexities. While these topics are central to the normative theories of political decisionmaking developed in the organizational and political paradigms mentioned in section 2, few of the psychological contributions deal with this topic in an elaborate way.
Groupthink theory is a marked exception. In fact, groupthink has explicitly been developed as a theory of explaining decisional failures and policy fiascoes. It is not surprising, therefore, that Longley and Pruitt note that "a negative evaluation of groupthink pervades all of Janis' writings about the topic" (Longley and Pruitt, 1980, p.77). They signal that even in the revised conception of groupthink as concurrence-seeking, the flow chart directly links concurrenceseeking and groupthink characteristics to symptoms of defective decision-making, which are presented as a recipe for policy failure.
However, in his 1982 edition, Janis is not entirely as deterministic about the alleged adverse effects of groupthink as Longley and Pruitt suspect. In the final analysis, according to Janis, groupthink is not a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for policy failure (Janis, 1982a, pp. 11, 196-197, 259) . He does suggest that groupthink increases the likelihood of defective decision processes, which, in turn, increase the likelihood of disastrous policy outcomes. Still it is quite clear that, in Janis's mind, groupthink is a certain road to failure. In fact, in his research strategy, he departed from this premise: He chose cases of (alleged) policy failure first, and then applied groupthink analysis to see whether the decision process was affected by it. If so, groupthink was implied to be one of the causes of failure. This methodology places a high premium on the objectivity of the analyst to withstand (unconscious) biases towards selective interpretation of the case study material. Also, this reconstructive-analytical and evaluative approach is open to accusations of producing circular statements: Groupthink is inferred from policy failure and failure is explained in terms of groupthink.3
The link between concurrence-seeking and defective decision-making is evident from the specification of the eight symptoms of groupthink: From a procedural point of view, they appear to be all bad (see boxes C and D in flow chart). However, to understand the implied link between defective decision processes and decisional failures, one must first take a look at Janis's broader views on the issue of decision quality, as formulated in his classic study of decisionmaking, written with Leon Mann (Janis and Mann, 1977) . Janis adheres to the paradigm prevalent in decision theory that "good" (i.e., systematic, vigilant) procedures produce "good" results (goal maximization). In his view, decision quality is contingent upon the quality of the deliberations preceding the actual choice. Good procedures virtually ensure good results (defined as optimal outcomes with the limits of the situation). Therefore, the authors have adopted a model of decision quality that is entirely procedural. It comprises seven "critical tasks" for high-quality decision making: hence (logically deduced from the authors' premises), the near-certainty of failing policy outcomes. This line of reasoning is not entirely unproblematic.
Symptoms of Groupthink Reassessed?
Longley and Pruitt contend the linkage between the symptoms of groupthink (box C) and defective decision-making (box D) is one-sided. They contend that "symptoms of groupthink as self-censorship, urging dissenters to curtail their remarks, avoiding the influx of outside opinions, and even collective rationalizations are eventually necessary in many decision making sequences" (Longley and Pruitt, 1980, p.77) . In other words, they maintain that these features can also be detected in decision-making processes that would qualify as high quality. Mechanisms for consensus-building are necessary to come to a decision at all. If no limits were to be put upon the duration, scope, and likely outcomes of their deliberations, decision groups would never come around to anything. According to Longley and Pruitt, the crucial factors involved in determining whether the above characteristics of groupthink really obstruct a sound process of deliberation about choice are:
(a) their timing. If one curtails discussion too early one falls into the trap envisaged by Janis; but if one, for instance, uses these mechanisms to shortcircuit repetitive and low-utility discussions, they might actually enhance the quality of deliberation; (b) the type of decision task that the group faces. Longley and Pruitt cite Katz and Kahn (1978) , who differentiate between dilemma-like issues requiring innovative solutions-which, in turn, demand very elaborate and wide-ranging discussions with a minimum of closure and focusing during the key deliberations on the one hand-and normal problems that are less complex and can be solved more easily, thus, not necessitating too elaborate discussion.
It follows that the above-mentioned groupthink symptoms will probably hurt the quality of decision-making about "dilemmas," while they may be neutral or even functional in "regular problem solving." It is interesting to see that in his recent book, Janis (1989) has paid ample attention to specifying the conditions under which his newly developed "constraints" model of decision-making is applicable. Specifically, he asserts that the problematic nature of distorted decision procedures is most clearly felt when decision makers are faced with important decisions, necessitating consequential choices-as opposed to more simple routine choices. The heuristics, biases, and other cognitive and motivational barriers to strictly rational-synoptic or, in Janis's more realistic terms, "vigilant" decision-making, are problematic only when decision-makers are faced with difficult problems for which there are no standard solutions. This suggests that, as far as groupthink is concerned, it is not really interesting to perform groupthink analyses of regular problem-solving groups at some lower-level of management or policy-making. Instead, and compatible to Longley and Pruitt's assertion, one should concentrate on high-level decision groups at the pinnacle of the organization or government where the stakes are high, standard solutions are lacking, and "bad" procedures for deliberation and choice are likely to be self-defeating.
Effects of Groupthink Re-assessed?
As far as this linkage between procedures and failing outcomes is concerned, it could be suggested on theoretical grounds that the linkage between the symptoms of defective decision-making as produced by groupthink and the incidence of policy failure is truly one of probability, and not of necessity. In other words, "bad" procedures need not always produce bad results; decision-makers may get lucky. Similarly, well-conceived decisions may result in fiascoes, because of failing implementation, unforeseen adversities, and so on. The pervasiveness of uncertainties has led Dror (1986) to characterize policy-making as a process of "fuzzy gambling." Janis is obviously aware of this need for qualification. However, in groupthink analysis, the de facto line of reasoning has been that groupthink produces defective decision-making procedures which, in turn, produce policy fiascoes.
Recently, Herek et al. (1987) have presented some empirical evidence suggesting that the implied direct connection between processes and outcomes of decision-making is indeed highly relevant. They examined 19 cases of U.S. presidential decision-making during international crises, using a selection of high-quality academic studies. Subsequently, they rated the quality of the decision-making process using operational definitions of the seven procedural criteria mentioned above. Then, they had two experts (from opposite ends of the conservative-liberal continuum in their personal views of the cold war-in order to control for ideology effects) make ratings of the outcomes of each of the crisesusing two criteria: advancement of U.S. national interests and reduction of international tensions in the post-crisis period. This design enabled them to investigate their hypothesis that high-quality decision-making procedures during crises are associated with better crisis outcomes than are defective decisionmaking procedures.
There proved to be "sizable" correlations between process and outcome scores. Higher scores on symptoms of defective decision-making were related both to more unfavorable immediate outcomes for U.S. vital interests and to more unfavorable immediate outcomes for international conflict. Correlations do not allow statements about causality. Therefore, several alternative, third-factor and methodological explanations were probed-and discounted. In the end, the authors conclude that
The findings of the present study thus bear out the surmises of those social scientists who have concluded that poor-quality procedures used in arriving at a decision give rise to avoidable errors that increase the likelihood of obtaining an unsatisfactory outcome. (Herek, Janis & Huth, 1987) While this piece of research does not explicitly deal with the effects of groupthink on policy outcomes, the gist of its argument is quite pertinent in this respect. The assertions by organizationally and politically oriented analysts appear to be incorrect: Decision process does matter in determining policy outcomes; groupthink, therefore, is a real danger to effective decision-making.
One might object to this conclusion by criticizing the highly imaginative, yet in many respects debatable, research design. Take the operationalization of outcome quality. What are vital U.S. interests in any given crisis? Is it not conventional wisdom that national interests are, at best, an ambiguous measuring rod for success and failure of policies-for instance, if one takes seriously the perspective on policy-making as an outcome of political processes between different agencies all defending their own institutionally shaped views of what actions the national interest seems to require in any given case (see, however, George, 1980)? How relevant a criterion is the short-term reduction of international tensions from a broad, strategic geopolitical perspective? Yet, on the other hand, Janis and others rightly assert that their interpretation of process-outcome linkages is, at least, not contradicted or disconfirmed by empirical evidence. Others remain critical. In fact, the article was followed by a rather sharp polemic with Welch who attacked the article's methodology and main assertions about decision quality, using the Cuban missile crisis case as an example [Welch (1989) Part of the problem in the discussion on groupthink and decision quality comes from the choice of criteria for assessing decision quality. While Welch's critique focused primarily on Herek et al.'s assessment of the decision-making process in view of the Janis and Mann criteria, I suspect that many political scientists may challenge the criteria themselves. This takes us to the very limits of interdisciplinary theorizing. Janis is a psychologist analyzing and evaluating political decision processes. His analytical instruments, however, are derived largely from psychological studies of decision-making. The seven criteria presented by Janis and Mann do seem to be based on an essentially rationalist, "problem-solving" view of the nature of decision processes. However, in the "organizational" and "political" paradigms of political decision-making discussed earlier, other types of rationality are taken into account. These pertain, for instance, to the symbolic nature of many problem-solving activities (Feldman and March, 1981), the primacy of "domestic" consensus and legitimacy (Lebow, 1981) and the defense of organizationally defined interests and definitions of the common cause (Rosenthal et al., 1991) . Adhering to this limited functionalist perspective on rationality and decision quality, Janis and his associates run the risks of propagating a one-sided view of success and failure of policy decisions. As Jervis (1989, p.442) has observed, ". . . psychologists . . . often neglect the possibility that what appear to be errors on the part of politicians are really devious strategies for seeking less than admirable goals. Thus, a statesman who seems inconsistent or confused may be seeking the support of opposed factions." George (1980) has already indicated that high-level decision-makers are constantly trading off competing requirements: analytically-sound problem-solving, engendering and maintaining support and legitimacy, and managing scarce decision resources such as time and expertise. From this perspective, one could go on to point to recent studies that have indicated that it may be very effective for political decision-makers to adopt seemingly "irrational" stances and policies (Brunsson, 1985; Dror, 1971; Mandel, 1984 This brings us to the heart of the matter. The debate on the quality of processes and outcomes of decision-making is, ultimately, a political one. It is loaded with complex issues of value judgment. For example, Wildavsky's book can easily be read as much a political manifesto as a moder-day defense of liberal capitalism and the entrepreneurial spirit. It is highly critical of many social interventions mitigating the development of hazardous technologies, as the latter are viewed as the key to long-term economic and social progress: "richer is safer versus poorer is sicker". Likewise, one might speculate to which extent Janis's study on groupthink reflects its author's conviction about many American foreign policy initiatives involving the use of military force in foreign countries. It is perhaps no coincidence that the two cases of policy success-where groupthink was avoided-were also instances where policy-making was directed toward prevention of large-scale military force (Marshall plan, Cuba 1962). Many political psychologists studying international relations have shared these concerns, and have taken more explicitly "dovish" positions (see White, 1986; Jervis 1989 ).
Concluding Remarks
The fact that, at present, we can only speculate about such issues alerts us to an important development required in psychological studies of political decisionmaking, namely the introduction of greater political sophistication. Janis's con-tribution to the evaluation of the quality of policymaking is undoubted, if only for his unusually clear distinction between quality of process and quality of outcomes. Yet it is necessary to go beyond his work and try to integrate other types of rationality and policy evaluation into our analytical frameworks (see Farnham, 1990 ).
The debate on groupthink and decision quality will continue. Meanwhile groupthink theory has made a main contribution by taking it from rather abstract into very concrete judgment on quality of decision process and outcomes in the context of important events, for example in major international crises.
Equally important, by its intricate blend of small-group dynamics and political decision-making, Janis's work on groupthink has inspired many interdisciplinary efforts. It stands out as a clear, if still developing, example of the need for analysis of policy and politics to probe multilevel explanations rather than continuing to maintain rationalistic assumptions about individual and collective policy choices. Also, groupthink and other psychological concepts provide a very useful counterweight to the strong meso-level bias of organizational and political paradigms. A task ahead is to further try to integrate these various approaches, levels of analyses and research methodologies. Such a move to incorporate (individual and) small-group levels of analysis into more comprehensive research designs should, however, always be based on a clear understanding of the inherent limitations of (social-)psychological approaches. In this respect, it is ironic to note that despite Janis's own exemplary caution in outlining each step in the analytical sequence of a case analysis (in particular in his Watergate case study), the very popularity of groupthink may, in fact, act as an impediment to careful interdisciplinary integration. This emerges clearly from the uncritical adoption of sections on "the dangers of groupthink" in many policy analysis and management handbooks.
In the meantime, it is worthwhile to establish with greater precision the antecedents and dynamics of groupthink, and arrive at better-grounded diagnostics of when, how, and why groupthink occurs. From there on, we can follow Janis's lead in trying to prevent or mitigate groupthink, as well as further explore its potential positive functions in specific types of decision situations. This should be done by social scientists from different disciplines using different methodologies.
